Can international trade law be utilized to promote the freedom of speech in
INTRODUCTION
When economic operators trade internationally, not only do goods and services cross national boundaries, but so do the culture, opinions, information, and ideas that they carry.
2 This creates complex links between the regulation of international trade and international human rights law. Measures that restrict the freedom of speech may concurrently interfere with international trade, while barriers to trade may encroach upon the freedom of expression, 3 which under international law applies "regardless of frontiers."
4
The link between these two regimes is more than theoretical. A World Trade Organization (WTO) complaint brought by the European Union against China in 2008 challenged regulations that required all foreign fi-nancial information service providers to act, in essence, through China's central news agency, Xinhua.
5 While these regulations quite clearly violated international trade agreements, they simultaneously restricted the freedom of expression and access to information. 6 In 2009, a complaint by the United States showed that China had reserved the distribution of films, audiovisual entertainment products, sound recordings, and certain publications to state-designated and state-owned enterprises (Audiovisual Products Case) -again posing not only a trade problem but also a restriction on the freedom of expression. 7 In the same year, a WTO panel ruled partly against China despite its invocation of public order exceptions (IPR Enforcement Case), 8 because its copyright legislation denied protection from works that had not been authorized for public circulation by government censors, suggesting yet another interaction between trade and the freedom of expression.
9
What is striking in these cases is that international trade law and human rights seem to be mutually reinforcing, in contrast to the more familiar narrative in which trade liberalization somehow negates or overrides human rights. The fragmentation of international law is often considered a source of normative and institutional conflict. With respect to trade and 9. It should be noted that the trade-expression nexus is not exclusive to the WTO or trade agreements, and can also arise in human rights tribunals. For example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has recognized cross-border commercial activities as covered by the freedom of expression. See Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland, 173 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990); see also Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 276 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) (1993). Our focus here, however, is on the capacity of trade law and international economic institutions to promote the freedom of speech, not vice versa.
the freedom of expression, could the strengths of one regime actually promote the goals of another? More specifically, could a "Google case" -that is, a WTO complaint aimed against China's internet-filtering laws and practices, of the type that ultimately forced Google to downscale its commercial presence in China significantly, and relocate its servers to Hong Kong in 2010
10 -promote the freedom of speech? The relevance of this question has in fact arisen over recent years, as the extent to which internet-based communications companies, such as Skype, must adjust their commercial and technological operations to Chinese censorship requirements, is exposed.
11
Could trade law tear down the great "cyberwall" of China? The First Amendment Coalition, a U.S. nonprofit public interest organization, seems to think so. It has lobbied in favor of a Google case, touting its initiative (grounded in academic writing)
12 as "the biggest access-to-information and free speech case in history."
13 To this end, it has retained international trade law counsel, presenting a legal case against Chinese media control to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the U.S. The idea of trade and free speech marching in lockstep can be highly appealing to both the trade community and international human rights advocates. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to this concept as the "confluence thesis." In this Article, however, we skeptically assert that despite the intuition of a natural synergy between free trade and free speech, the real capacity of WTO law to promote free speech is significantly restricted, casting more than a shadow of doubt on the confluence thesis.
Part I locates the notion of confluence between trade liberalization and free speech in the broader "trade and human rights" debate. Part II explains the legal and functional differences between a human rights law approach to a restriction-on-free-speech and a trade-law approach, with particular reference to trade in goods, as analysis illustrative of the systemic obstacles to confluence that cut across all areas of WTO law. Part III presents two case studies that demonstrate the weakness of the confluence in practice, in the areas of trade in services and trade-related intellectual property rights. The Article concludes with general observations.
I. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FREE SPEECH: FIVE CONFIGURATIONS
Confluence between trade liberalization and human rights in general (and free speech in particular) is but one of several configurations of the trade law and human rights relationship. As one of us has elaborated elsewhere, 16 there are essentially five types of linkages between international trade law and human rights that have been contemplated, discussed, and indeed played out, at least since the establishment of the WTO. They are: (1) conflict; (2) conditionality; (3) constitutionalism; (4) conformity; and finally, (5) confluence.
Conflict is the basic idea that trade liberalization can contradict human rights, in principle or in practice. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO regime is built on the premise that trade liberalization stimulates economic growth and creates wealth. Such wealth generation might enable governments and societies to fulfill their human rights objectives (and obligations) more stringently. Mere economic growth, however, does not necessarily translate into greater and more equitably distributed wealth for the populace at large, and certainly does not imply us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/united-states-seeks-detailed-information-china's-i.
16 tional human rights may have its proponents, although empirical research casts doubt on both the real motivations for the establishment of human rights conditionality and the extent of its effectiveness, given the low degree of political willingness and capability to enforce it. 24 It is possible to consider the promotion of the international right to freedom of expression by conditionality, through measures that impose restrictions on or deny preferences from goods and services originating in states with a deficient free speech environment. Arguably, the inclusion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in the qualification criteria of the European Unions's Enhanced General Scheme of Preferences program does just that. 25 The effectiveness of this framework, however, is ultimately an empirical question for which little actual knowledge exists.
Constitutionalism, perhaps the most controversial strand of the trade and human rights debate, contemplates market freedoms as additional human rights.
26 Critics have vociferously argued that this approach misconstrues the foundations of human rights law, and threatens to erode them.
27 Constitutionalism in this vein 28 is a distinctive interpretation of the political philosophy of ordoliberalism, 29 and, as such, represents a particular normative understanding of global social order in which market-oriented rules are elevated to the level of human rights. Although the constitutional approach seeks conceptual harmony between trade disciplines and human rights, its impact upon human rights in general and the freedom of expression in particular is difficult to divine. Conformity is the functional idea that international trade law should be interpreted in light of human rights, not only in cases of potential conflict between trade and human rights, but also more generally. Sometimes this interpretative notion is advanced with respect to a particular human right or a cluster of rights, such as the right to development.
30 This is a very attractive approach, both normatively and doctrinally, serving a potential role in providing positive interactions between trade and other fields. Regarding the freedom of expression, it would expect international trade law to be interpreted in conformity with international human rights law. To date, the WTO law's tendency towards compartmentalization has not allowed this to happen.
31
In contrast to these configurations, the confluence thesis is both more modest and simultaneously more presumptuous. It proposes that trade law posseses sufficient overlaps with human rights law such that it can, at least in certain cases, spontaneously enhance traditional human rights. Yet the idea of confluence neither establishes a new category or class of human rights, as would forms of constitutionalism, nor relies on a particular justification or formulation of either trade law or human rights law, as would the conditionality and conformity frameworks. Rather, the confluence thesis considers economic liberalization as a veritable handmaiden of a human right. Instead of conflict, it posits a comfortable mutual reinforcement between two separate regimes of law that appear somehow to "point in the same direction," 32 in the sense that the removal of restrictions to trade may also promote the freedom of speech. In the following Part, we turn to examine the validity of the confluence thesis in the particular context of the freedom of expression. 
II. THE CONFLUENCE THESIS EXAMINED

A. The Divergent Rationales of International Trade Law and Human Rights with Respect to the Freedom of Speech
Both trade law and human rights value speech, but the weakness of the confluence thesis is soon exposed by the gaps between their respective reasoning. Two fundamentally different rationales for free speech exist: the utilitarian, justifying it as an instrument in the advancement of efficiency, truth, and democracy; 33 and the deontological, looking at the intrinsic value of human beings. While human rights law is shaped by both of these, trade law is, at best, informed by a narrow version of the former.
The utilitarian rationale theory goes back to John Stuart Mill: "[C]omplete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action." 34 Oliver Wendell Holmes concurred through the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas. 35 One need not believe in absolute truths, however, to accept that better outcomes may be reached through the comparison of various imperfect ideas. 36 Democratic systems vitally depend on the test of ideas in the public sphere, the free confrontation of government with the speech of its citizens, and, most prominently of all, the press. 37 Furthermore, open discourse may itself legitimate the outcome. 38 In contrast, the deontological rationale views freedom of expression as "an essential function of self-identity: the ability to express oneself as a means of constructing the self." 39 In international human rights law, this approach is manifest in the idea that all civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, "derive from the inherent dignity of the human 33 person." 40 The freedom of expression is the extension of the freedom to "hold opinions without interference" 41 and is closely related to the deontologically based freedom of conscience. 42 The trade scope of free speech, however, pursues only particular utilitarian goals: economic efficiency and market perfection. Free speech is promoted as a derivative of market freedom, or as one of its conditions, instead of an end goal in itself.
43 As John Jackson has written, "Some of these [human rights] are even necessary in order for markets to work. A particular example is free speech." 44 Thus, we find only partial and weak support for a conceptual confluence between liberal trade and the human right of free speech. Trade law views the freedom of speech as an instrument to promote economic market efficiency. The human rights rationale is much broader, including political freedoms as a good in and of themselves. The functional economic justification ends where expressions and information no longer have a market-perfecting contribution. In turning to the legal analysis of confluence, we must bear in mind the difference in the goals of international trade and human rights law with respect to the freedom of expression.
B. The Human Rights Law Framework
For confluence with the freedom of expression to be tested, an international trade element must be apparent, such as limitations on international commerce. To examine the human rights side of the confluence thesis, let us assume a restriction on trade that may be considered an infringement on the freedom of expression, such as a restriction on importing speechcontaining goods and services (for instance, a ban on the importation of a foreign book title or music album). An initial question in analyzing such trade restrictions with respect to international free speech law is whether states are under an obligation to respect the freedom of expression of foreign authors at all. The freedom of expression, like other human rights, 45 is a universal and effectively transnational human right.
46 It applies to every- 45. Amongst other rights, these include: the right to nondiscrimination, equality, and fairness; the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; the right to be presumed innocent; the right to freedom from slavery; and the right to freedom of torture.
46. See ICCPR, supra note 3, pmbl.; see also one, regardless of frontiers, therefore including all authors of expressions irrespective of their nationality or domicile.
47 An author of information or an idea expressed in one country has generally not exhausted her freedom of expression, which continues to apply in all other countries.
48 This is consistent with both utilitarian and deontological human rights rationales for the freedom of expression.
Further supporting this conclusion, rights protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR include not only the author's freedom of expression but also the right of "everyone" to access information -the corollary freedom to "seek" and to "receive" information and ideas.
49 This freedom of access to information is an important complement to the freedom to impart information. The same government measure may violate both freedoms. If a newspaper is banned from circulation, both the journalists' freedom of expression and readership's freedoms of access have been curtailed. This effectively emphasizes that the freedom of expression is of general public interest, not only of individual concern. Generally, "everyone" has the right to hear "everyone." While the party imparting an opinion may be intimidated from pursuing her individual freedom of expression, or lack the will to overcome the barriers to expression in a given jurisdiction, the resolve of a larger audience interested in hearing her opinion might be more difficult to repress, ultimately satisfying the same goals. Conversely, the removal of a restriction of the freedom of access to information would have little real impact if the freedom of expression were not upheld.
The ICCPR expansively protects ideas and information expressed orally, in writing, in print, as art, or "through any other media." 50 Thus, all goods or services that are themselves expressions of ideas or information, or are physical media of such, should normally lie within the scope of the protection of the freedom of expression. Indeed, the UN Human Rights Committee has held this protection to also include commercial speech.
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The substantive range of international human rights protections of the freedom of expression, therefore, is very broad, albeit subject to exceptions and limitations, which will be addressed briefly below. 
C. The International Trade Law Framework
In this Section we highlight some of the fundamental incongruities that emerge when a restriction on the freedom of expression is analyzed as a trade measure. WTO provisions hinge on several technical factors that diminish or even annul the functional confluence between trade rules and human rights law. To demonstrate this, we will focus on the area of trade in goods and its regulation under GATT.
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Quantitative restrictions: Consider first a deceptively simple hypothetical that encapsulates some of the complexities of our inquiry: a ban instituted by a WTO Member on the importation of foreign-printed copies of a particular book title, otherwise readily available on the domestic market from local publishers.
To begin with, the book title import ban would likely be considered a quantitative restriction prohibited under Article XI of GATT, since it is implemented only at the border, on the importation of the book, and is not complemented by a ban on the production and distribution of the same book in the domestic market. 53 Because Article XI:1 of GATT refers to "prohibitions or restrictions . . . of any product," it would be immaterial if the ban did or did not apply to other book titles. 54 So long as the "product" is the particular title in question, the ban constitutes a "prohibition"; and if one considers instead the relevant product to be books in general or some subcategory thereof, the ban is a "restriction," which is similarly GATT inconsistent, subject to certain general exceptions that will be discussed below. 55 Interestingly, in such a case GATT actually limits governmental measures more than human rights law does, reflecting its economic goals. The measure in question violates a GATT rule -indeed, a rule that is considered to be "one of the cornerstones of the GATT system" 56 -but because the book is, in our hypothetical, in fact available on the domestic market, the right of access to information as well as the author's freedom of expression remain intact. The only freedom of expression that is impaired is that of the foreign publishers -whose interest is primarily, if not exclusively, commercial. Even this might not be the case, if the foreign publishers were not prevented from publishing the book within the domestic market, so that their right to publish the book's content would not be precluded.
In this respect, the stricter protection by trade law exists even though, as we have seen, human rights law protects foreign and domestic expressions alike, but in contrast, the terms of Article XI:1 of GATT apply only to a "product of the territory of any other contracting party." 57 This qualification draws a distinction between foreign and domestic products, which human rights law does not. Quite simply, GATT does not grant privileges to domestic products. That does not pose a difficulty, to say the least, for the domestic publishers in our hypothetical, because the book ban in that hypothetical does not prevent the local production and distribution of the book, and indeed, prefers local publishers over the foreign ones. This, indeed, is the basis for applying Article XI:1 of GATT (on quantitative restrictions) in the first place. The economic goal of GATT/WTO in the removal of the ban is clear: The ban merely reserves the local market to locally printed editions, and this creates economic inefficiency. On the other hand, the human rights interest in the removal of the restriction is minimal. The interests protected by Article XI:1 of GATT and the freedom of expression diverge significantly in this case, in the sense that, generally speaking, human rights would be quite indifferent to a removal of the trade barrier.
A second, alternative, hypothetical confirms this analysis. Let us now imagine that a WTO Member bans the domestic sale and distribution of a particular book title across the board, and not just the importation of its foreign-produced physical copies. Arguably, such a law is no longer a border measure, but a rule applying to imported and domestic products alike and hence is to be analyzed under the nondiscrimination clause of Article III of GATT, and not under Article XI:1 of GATT.
58 Clearly, freedom of speech as well as access to information are infringed in this example, yet Article XI:1 of GATT, which does not apply, cannot be relied upon to prevent the infringement.
Article XI:1 of GATT hence diverges significantly from the protection of the freedom of expression. If, on the one hand, the expressive good is 57. GATT, supra note 52, art. XI:1 (emphasis added). banned from importation but is nonetheless available domestically, the prohibition of quantitative restrictions may apply, but human rights are generally fulfilled regardless of the import ban or its removal. If, on the other hand, the good is banned entirely on the domestic market, Article XI:1 is arguably not the relevant GATT provision.
This hypothetical analysis is upheld by jurisprudence related to similar, though technically more complicated, problems relating to expressive goods. A 1984 GATT panel 59 found that restrictions instituted by the United States on the importation of printed material under the (now defunct) "Manufacturing Clause" were violations of Article XI of GATT. Much of the panel report revolved on temporal issues with no bearing on the free speech-free trade nexus, and the substantive inconsistency of the Manufacturing Clause with Article XI:1 of GATT was not even contested by the United States. 60 The Manufacturing Clause prohibited the importation into the United States and public distribution therein of copyrighted, non-dramatic, literary works in the English language authored by U.S. domiciliaries, unless they had been manufactured in the United States or Canada. The Manufacturing Clause had implications in the area of international intellectual property (well before intellectual property rights were introduced to the GATT system under TRIPS), because copyright protection was denied to works imported in contravention of the Manufacturing Clause. More fundamentally, however, the U.S. measure was simply a ban on the importation of a particular class of foreign published books, deliberately aimed at nurturing and sustaining the domestic U.S. publishing industry. 61 Like the hypothetical book ban above, the Manufacturing Clause did not preclude the freedom of expression of U.S. (or indeed foreign) authors or publishers, although it did restrict the U.S. commercial activity of foreign publishers. The Manufacturing Clause was clearly protectionist from a trade viewpoint, and the panel report is faultless in its application of GATT law. The finding that U.S. legislation was not GATT consistent, however, could have had no appreciable effect on the freedom of expression.
In or similar editorial content as those available abroad, but containing advertisements directed at the Canadian market. Periodicals domestically produced with the same advertising material were not prohibited. 63 This ban was straightforwardly found to be a violation of Article XI of GATT, shifting the discussion to GATT's general exceptions. 64 The CanadaPeriodicals Case clearly related to the commercial interests, and commercial speech, of media and advertisers. Yet even this commercial speech, in the form of advertisements directed at the Canadian market, would have been available to the public through Canadian advertising media, in Canadian printed periodicals, which were not restricted by the measure. The removal of the disputed legislation would hardly have had an effect on the freedom of expression or access to information in Canada. 65 There is one scenario, however, in which the removal of an import ban relating to a book title promotes the freedoms of expression and access to information in a manner that makes available information that was not available before. If the title were not banned from publication or distribution within the country, but simply not available in the market, for instance for economic reasons (like insufficient market size), the import ban would then effectively prevent access to the book's content, and a successful challenge under Article XI of GATT could allow such access to foreign sources. The importing country could avoid this outcome, however, by extending the ban to domestic production (leading into a national treatment analysis, discussed below).
Overall, the analysis of Article XI of GATT shows that it might have some limited parallels with the freedom of expression, but also, more clearly, that there exists significant divergence, and in practice the prohibition of quantitative restrictions does not promote speech to a significant extent. The divergence is also apparent in an analysis of an import ban on a good that does not incorporate an expression but rather facilitates itsuch as a computer or telephone. Consider a case in which a WTO Member bans the importation of camera-equipped cellphones, of the type that has recently proven very effective in increasing access to information (in the Arab Spring, for example).
66 If the regulation allowed domestic production of such cellphones, but banned the importation of such products from abroad, this would, prima facie, constitute a GATT Article XI issue, especially if cellphones were in fact domestically produced; but then, this would not create a restriction of the freedom of expression. In contrast, restrictions on the use of cellphones would restrict speech, but generally might not restrict trade.
National Treatment: As we have argued, a complete domestic ban on the distribution of a book title (including imports) would have to be analyzed under Article III of GATT, that is the national treatment principle. National treatment generally provides that all taxes and regulations affecting the internal sale of products "should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production." 67 This pertains even if the tax is collected, or the regulation is applied to the foreign product, at the time or point of importation. 68 Taxation applied to "like" domestic products should not be "in excess of" taxation applied to domestic products. 69 Any other regulations applied to imported products shall be "no less favourable" than the treatment accorded to the "like" domestic product. 70 If the domestic and imported products being compared are not "like" and yet belong to the broader category of "directly competitive or substitutable products," differential treatment would still run afoul of GATT if the tax afforded protection to the domestic product. 71 In this brief schematic description of the national treatment principle in Article III of GATT, we find significant weaknesses in promoting the freedom of expression, revealing significant divergence rather than confluence. First, by definition the national treatment principle aims at "leveling the playing field" between foreign and domestic producers and goods. This is a market-oriented principle, but one that does not have the capacity to remove regulatory restrictions that are nondiscriminatory. A restriction on free speech or access to information that is equally intolerant, even repressive, of expressions embedded in or facilitated by foreign and domestic goods will be unmoved by national treatment. Second, a measure that violates national treatment by granting a preference to a local product may contravene trade law but not human rights law, at least to the extent that the freedom of expression is allowed through the domestic product, similarly to what we have shown with respect to import bans. Third, as a general matter, national treatment, with its focus on the source of products and the nebulous concept of product "likeness," is a comparative rule. The freedom of expression is not -it applies without comparison to the treatment of others, and regardless of nationality.
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To see how these gaps play out in practice, consider the same book-title ban we discussed with respect to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions, except that now it applies not only towards imports (either internally or at the point of importation), but is augmented by a complementary and equivalent ban on domestic production and distribution of the same book title. Such a ban is more clearly aimed at preventing the expression embedded in the book from gaining public purchase in the territory of the restricting Member, and from a human rights perspective, it would undoubtedly be a restriction on the freedom of expression. From a trade viewpoint, however, there would be, at least prima facie, no violation of national treatment because the same product is being granted the same (negative) regulatory treatment.
Under a different scenario, if a book title were banned or otherwise prevented from local publication, but not for import, trade law would have nothing to say in this respect, since there would be no restriction of imports or discrimination against foreign producers. Conversely, however, if national regulations granted a preference to domestic production, sales and distribution of the book -not as an import ban (which would constitute a quantitative restriction), but as a tax preference, for example -there might be a violation of trade law, but the restriction on the freedom of expression would be minimal. In the Canada -Periodicals Case, the measure at issue, whereby an eighty-percent excise tax was levied only on the value of foreign-printed "split-run" periodicals, was found to violate Article III:2 of GATT. 73 Yet the discriminatory tax could hardly have been considered a violation of international human rights law.
International trade lawyers will quickly note that this discussion of the book ban simplifies the issues by treating the foreign and domestic editions of the banned book as the only relevant products. In practice, national treatment in GATT/WTO law depends on the scope of "like" products that the WTO jurisprudence has likened to an accordion that "stretches and squeezes in different places." 74 The foreign-printed, restricted title is surely "like" its domestically produced version, but is it also "like" domestically manufactured editions of other book titles that are not restricted or banned in any way?
72. Nevertheless, the freedom of expression is subject to the general norm of nondiscrimination in political rights. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 2. On the one hand, the products whose treatment should be compared might include all books of all sorts, but this would ignore the underlying issue of substitutability and competition that informs the question of "likeness." Telephone books and motorcycle maintenance manuals, 75 both printed and bound, are not in competition with each other, regardless of their place of publication, any more than are law reviews and suspense novels. On the other hand, the general ban of particular titles while permitting the domestic distribution of domestically published books of similar content but different authorship seems to enter the domain of product likeness. 76 Further increasing the resolution of the inquiry into likeness along these lines is a slippery slope potentially leading ad absurdum to queries such as whether Voltaire and Balzac, or Shakespeare and Marlowe are "like"; 77 or whether different translations of the Bible are directly competitive or substitutable.
The established WTO product-likeness tests relate to the good (the book, in this case), seemingly with little regard to its expressive content. The cumulative tests are physical properties, consumer preferences, enduses, and a sufficiently detailed tariff classification. 78 These tests might be helpful in some narrow circumstances, at least if clear differences in consumer preferences were shown (for example, hardcover versus paperback editions), but generally they are not appropriate for the purpose of defining categories of expression. Books of similar character or genre would be aimed at the same audiences and might be considered "like." Indeed, the Canada -Periodicals Case panel, in comparing imported "split-run" periodicals and domestic non-"split-run" periodicals for the purpose of determining "likeness," made clear that it was not its mandate to consider the likeness of "periodicals in general." 79 In that case, however, the panel could fall back on a market distinction that did not relate to the substan- 76. This hypothetical borders on copyright protection can also be viewed from a national treatment perspective. Consider, for example, the case of The Adventurous Prince, a book of Chinese authorship by Zhou Yiwen and intended for Chinese readership, but reportedly accused of bearing a strong resemblance to J.K. tive content of the foreign and domestic periodicals. If one is to pursue the path of likeness in comparing foreign and domestic expressive products seriously, some reference to their content would appear to be necessary.
In any case, what emerges is that where different books (or indeed other expressive media, including digital products) are similar enough for national treatment requirements to apply, trade law can be useful in promoting the freedom of expression of the relevant authors as well as (foreign) publishers. Several paradoxes, however, reduce the potential human rights effect of this seeming confluence. Most clearly, none of the substantive distinctions that inform the question of product likeness under Article III of GATT matter as far as human rights law is concerned. Subject to specific exceptions, a book ban is a restriction of the freedom of expression, regardless of the book's similarity or dissimilarity to other expressions, by other authors, whatever its comparative basis or scope. Furthermore, the more similar the domestic and foreign expressive products are to each other (and hence, the greater the potential for applying national treatment rules), the smaller the ban's impact on the availability of the different ideas on the "marketplace of ideas," as the same expression and information would already be available. Clearly, the ban of an author's expression remains an infringement of the freedom of expression even though the idea is already available in the market from another source. One cannot fail to notice, however, that the likelihood of an application of Article III of GATT decreases the more vulnerable the right to the freedom of expression is.
In general, the national treatment requirements of international trade law have little direct impact on the freedom of expression, if at all. They clearly promote only foreign-produced products that embed or facilitate expression. They rely on comparative issues, such as the like-product test, that are much more detailed than those of human rights law, and are irrelevant to substantive human rights. When they do apply, they do so in situations where the freedom of expression is not particularly vulnerable. In some cases a trade cause might parallel a human rights cause, but there is little basis to claim consistent substantive confluence.
This analysis of interactions between the basic GATT provisions and the freedom of speech is by no means exhaustive. We have not, for example, set out the relationship between exceptions to the freedom of expression in human rights law, on the one hand, and exceptions to the GATT obligations, on the other hand. Here too, however, the absence of confluence is evident. In a nutshell, while both legal regimes allow for public morals exceptions, 80 among others, and examine their validity through tests of necessity and proportionality, they entail very different balancing exercises. In human rights, the justification for a restriction on the freedom of expression is assessed directly in comparison with the burden caused to the individual whose speech has been restricted. 81 In trade, the public morals exception of Article XX(a) of GATT has indeed been invoked to justify censorship, with no reference to human rights considerations -a policy that is anathema to freedom of expression. 82 While a claim to justify all censorship under Article XX(a) of GATT is clearly exaggerated, the comparison in that provision is (very roughly stated), not with the restriction on speech, but rather with the extent to which the measure restricts trade. 83 This clearly could lead to disparate results, such as a book ban found to be justified under trade law but not under human rights law.
Turning full circle, we see that the separate rationales of the two areas of law underlie their different coverage of the same measure, making confluence uncertain, arbitrary and sporadic, rather than systematic. In the next Part we demonstrate the absence of confluence in two actual cases, beyond physical goods such as books and beyond GATT, in trade and services-and intellectual property-related issues.
III. CONFLUENCE IN ACTION? THE IMPACT OF WTO CASES ON THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A. The China-IPR Enforcement Dispute
The IPR Enforcement Case 84 was the first WTO complaint that included a direct challenge to a national measure whose non-trade-related aim was at least in part to restrict an internationally recognized human right -the freedom of expression.
85 It therefore provides an excellent testing ground for the confluence thesis. One measure at issue in the dispute was the first sentence of Article 4 of China's Copyright Law, whereby "works the publication and/or dissemination of which are prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law."
86 The United States argued that this provision constituted a violation of Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the Berne Convention, 87 as incorporated by Article 9.1 of TRIPS, and of Articles 14, 41.1, and 61 of TRIPS. We will focus on the claim under Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention, which is the most relevant here. The claim was, in essence, that by depriving copyright protection from works that could not legally be published in China under its censorship laws, 88 China was in violation of its WTO obligations. Although not addressed in the dispute, for our present purposes, one can consider that a trade-human rights confluence would have occurred if the removal of the trade law (that is, TRIPS) violation had promoted the freedom of expression.
Indeed, the denial of copyright protection was certainly part of China's overall system of censorship. It referred to rules and regulations that established which expressions were considered illegal in China, and deferred to the governmental system of "content control." That China's copyright law was in fact aimed at reinforcing the repressive effect of Chinese censorship is made abundantly clear by China's claim that the denial of copyright from unauthorized works was covered by the Berne Convention's Article 17 defense. Article 17 states that the Convention "cannot in any way affect the right of the Government . . . to permit, to control, or to prohibit . . . the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or production in regard to which the competent authority may find it necessary to exercise that right."
89 China was essentially arguing that its authority to censor expression overrode its trade obligations.
The United States, as complainant in the case, and subsequently the WTO Panel in its Report, agreed that Article 17 of the Berne Convention allowed interference in the enjoyment of rights in protected works, but, as 85 . For detailed analysis of the dispute, see Broude, supra note 31, at 660. 86. Panel Report, China -Protection, supra note 8, ¶ 7.1. 87. Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention establishes a national treatment obligation and an obligation to respect author's minimum rights "specially granted" by the Convention, which include the substantive rights of copyright. the Panel stated, " [T] here is no reason to suppose that censorship will eliminate those rights entirely with respect to a particular work." 90 In other words, in the copyright context, a government may choose to ban the circulation of certain works, but that is not relevant to the question of whether those works are eligible for copyright protection. Hence, the Panel determined that copyright should be protected in any case. The Panel's approach seems doctrinally sound. If China's denial of copyright was part of its censorship system, one might assume that the Panel's ruling against this denial of copyright is pro-free speech, supporting the confluence thesis. By removing the TRIPS violation and ensuring that copyright is enforceable, the negative effects on the freedom of expression might also be cured.
The Panel's decision, however, is at best a pyrrhic victory for the freedom of speech. Firstly, it protects material that does not necessarily fall under the protection of the freedom of expression under international law. The ruling means that the vilest of child pornography material or hate speech -content whose censorship would have been justified by the human rights exceptions of ICCPR's Article 19.3 91 -can still enjoy copyright, even if the state (China, in this case) determines that it is illegal to publish and disseminate it. Secondly, however, even the most pedestrian educational content, or the most elevated and universally accepted moral content can be absolutely banned, as far as the narrow TRIPS framework is concerned, so long as its copyright is protected under trade law -even if the ban were not justifiable under human rights law. Thirdly, Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention as incorporated by TRIPS only relates to the rights of authors "in countries . . . other than the country of origin," and hence the decision applies only to China's treatment of non-Chinese rights holders. 92 The Panel report thus technically applies only to non-Chinese authors and their works. A banned Chinese work can still be denied copyright on the basis of its content, with all the derivative, negative effects on the freedom of expression.
What is worse, arguably, is the direct negative impact of the Panel report on the freedom of speech of foreign authors and the freedom of access to information in China. China is now bound by a WTO Panel report that requires it to grant copyright protection to content it censors. In addition to censorship laws, the full weight of copyright enforcement -criminal and administrative -must now be brought to bear on unauthorized 90 . Panel Report, China -Protection, supra note 8, ¶ 7.132. 91. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 19.3. 92. Berne Convention, supra note 87, art. 5(1).
works. In other words, copyright can -indeed, must -now be used to stifle expressions and their dissemination.
Indeed, China itself, in its statements before the Panel, acknowledged the mutually reinforcing effect of copyright protection and censorship. At one point China argued that a content ban is itself an effective protection against violation of copyright, and is "in a sense an alternative form of enforcement against infringement."
93 In another context, China referred to the negative rights of copyright holders as "private censorship."
94 These comments aptly capture the paradoxical power of copyright enforcement to restrict the freedom of speech -ironically harking back to one of the origins of copyright law in "stationer's copyright," rights granted to members of the book trade seeking to protect their monopoly and granted by a government trying to police the press.
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In sum, although the IPR Enforcement Case dealt with a measure that both violated WTO law and was aimed at restricting the freedom of expression, the operation of WTO dispute settlement was to remove the trade law violation without promoting the human right -epitomizing the absence of confluence.
B. The China-Audiovisual Products Case
The difficult relationship between free speech and free trade is further illustrated by the Audiovisual Products Case. 96 The United States challenged a series of Chinese measures (ranging from foreign investment regulations to film distribution and exhibition rules) as they related to the importation and distribution of reading material, audiovisual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and films for theatrical release. The Chinese regulations were complex, differing from product to product and according to the foreign involvement, forcing us to oversimplify the facts. In general the effect of the Chinese regulation was as follows: China maintained a content review process for these products. Imports and their distribution into China were channeled, in the case of imports, through selected Chinese state-owned importers (which in some cases conducted the "content review" in-house), and in the case of domestic distribution, through a number of normally lesser restrictions. 97 The United States con-and the freedom of expression (and its corollary, the freedom of access to information) effectively refutes the confluence thesis. Indeed, the international legal regimes of human rights law as to free speech and world trade law do overlap in various respects. They clearly do not, however, march in lockstep towards a brighter future for both free trade and free expression. The goals of the two legal systems, when applied to the same restrictive governmental measure, are fundamentally different in their utilitarian and deontological dimensions. The applicable substantive rules operate in very different ways: In some scenarios, trade law applies stricter standards, while at other times, human rights law is more demanding. These rules, and the public-policy exceptions and derogations that accompany them, apply significantly different balancing tests, reflecting the divergent goals of the two systems. Thus, any commonality between the fields is arbitrary, inconsistent and unforeseeable, rather than systematic and mutually reinforcing. WTO law has no methodical, free speech-enhancing effect. It is aimed at trade liberalization. While this objective does, at times, seem to point in a similar direction as the protection of the freedom of expression, the relationship is uneasy and disharmonious. It can even regress to the conflictual -a complaint based on trade law aimed at measures that restrict both trade and speech may result in more liberal trade but more restrictive censorship. We have seen this occur, both in theory and in practice, in the case studies of the IPR Enforcement and Audiovisual Products cases. Even when a WTO case has been won by a Member, a triumph for the freedom of expression might prove elusive or even counterproductive.
These conclusions do not bode well for the human rights aspects of a prospective "Google case." A WTO challenge to China's internet censorship system might prove successful in promoting the access of nonChinese internet businesses to the Chinese market (although this is also questionable, as others have analyzed in detail), 120 but the effects on the exercise of the freedom of expression and access to information in China would likely be marginal at best, and harmful at worst.
This analysis ultimately provides a somber cautionary tale for both trade law and international human rights. For the WTO, and indeed for other trade agreements, taking up the cause of the freedom of speech would be too heavy a burden, and one that would merely be harmful to its overarching legitimacy. No less importantly, for human rights, and especially for rights advocates, it is clearly dangerous to make instrumental use of trade law for the promotion of the freedom of expression.
